Brusilovsky breakthrough. The Splendor and Poverty of the Russian Imperial Army

The Brusilov breakthrough, which began on June 4, 1916, is a bright spot in the dim background of Russia’s participation in the First World War. But, counting our losses during this offensive, it is time to recall King Pyrrhus: “One more such victory, and I will be left without an army.”

Between a coward and a traitor

Adjutant General Alexey Alekseyevich Brusilov He was appointed to command the South-Western Front in March 1916. On the entire line of contact with the German and Austro-Hungarian troops, it was regarded as secondary. More important were the Northwestern (General Kuropatkin) and Western (General Evert) fronts. On April 1, a military council was held in Mogilev, where the imperial headquarters was located, at which plans for military operations for 1916 were outlined.

In the book of memoirs, which is also called “Memoirs”, Brusilov wrote about the course of the event: “Kuropatkin said that it was very difficult to count on the success of his front and that, in his opinion, the breakthrough of the German front was absolutely incredible, because their fortified bands were strongly fortified.” He, in turn, said that he fully agreed with Kuropatkin’s opinion, did not believe in success, and believed that it would be better to continue to maintain a defensive mode of action until we had heavy artillery, at least in the same size as our enemy.

In short, in his memoirs, Brusilov brought out Kuropatkin as a coward, and Evert as a coward and a traitor. All in white — & nbsp; he alone, Alexey Alekseevich. When the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Mikhail Alekseev, asked him about his plans, he replied: “The South-Western Front, in my opinion, not only can, but must advance, and I believe that we have every chance of success, of which I am personally convinced.” To this General Alekseev replied that in principle he has no objections, but he considers it his duty to warn me that I will not receive anything in addition to the troops I have.”

No one could answer Brusilov. Evert was killed by the Chekists in 1917, Alekseev died in 1918, Kuropatkin in 1925. Neither of them left any memoirs.

Third way

The First World War had long since acquired a positional character. The Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian armies dug themselves into dugouts and trenches, and entangled the entire front line with barbed wire. The breakthrough of the enemy’s defense required many days of heavy artillery work, huge human casualties and the concentration of all forces in one place.

The way out of the positional impasse was sought either in toxic gases, or in the use of tanks. Brusilov, according to him, suggested a third way: “I ordered not in one, but in all the armies of the front entrusted to me to prepare one strike area, and in addition, in some corps to choose their own strike area and in all these areas to immediately begin earthworks to approach the enemy. Thanks to this, on the front entrusted to me, the enemy will see such earthworks in 20-30 places.

And the thunder broke

The offensive was postponed several times at the request of General Evert, a neighbor on the right, but at dawn on May 22, the Southwestern Front began to break through.

“I must admit,” Brusilov wrote in his Memoirs, ” that everywhere our artillery attack was crowned with complete success. In most cases, the passages were made in sufficient numbers and thoroughly, and the first fortified strip was completely swept away and, together with its defenders, turned into a pile of rubble and torn bodies.

In the post-war memoirs of a German military commander Ludendorff Russian Russian General Graf von Botmer completely repulsed the Russian attack in the area of Tarnopol, but in the other two areas the Russians were completely successful and deeply broke through the Austro-Hungarian front.

In the last days of Nyun, the Western Front launched an offensive on Baranovichi, which ended in failure and heavy losses. Evert’s troops followed the strategy of concentrating their forces on one area of the breakthrough and lost. It was not possible to hide the preparations for the offensive, and the enemy prepared in advance. In defense of Eveter, we can say that he was opposed by the Germans, and Brusilov was mainly opposed by Austrians, Hungarians, Croats, and Czechs… They were worse with the artillery, and the morale is well written Jaroslav Hasek. By the way, the brave soldier Schweik was captured by the Russian troops of the South-Western Front.

“At the end of October, in fact, the military operations of 1916 ended,” Brusilov wrote. From the day of the offensive on May 20 to November 1, over 450,000 officers and men were captured by the Southwestern Front. During this time, the enemy lost over 1,500,000 killed and wounded.

The political consequences of the Brusilov breakthrough were as follows: Austria-Hungary could not defeat Italy, and Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente. Russian troops liberated part of Eastern Galicia and all of Bukovina.

Fly in the ointment

In Soviet times, the Brusilov breakthrough was one of the few events of the First World War that historians willingly covered. Partly because, against the generally bleak backdrop of Russia’s involvement in that war, it was actually a success. Partly due to the fact that after the October Revolution, Brusilov switched sidesHowever, it is not difficult to notice that all the laudatory reviews about the Brusilov breakthrough were drawn by Soviet historians from the memoirs of Brusilov himself. More modern works make quite significant adjustments to this blissful image.

Historian Sergey Nelipovich, an employee of the IRI RAS, wrote in the 90s that the Brusilov breakthrough was largely mythologized, its success exaggerated, and the losses of the Russian army downplayed. Indeed, most sources say that by June 13, 1916, the Southwestern Front had lost only 497,000 men against the enemy’s million-strong losses by the end of the year. However, the operation continued to develop, so that by the fall, the Russian losses reached 1.5 million soldiers and officers. 

“Russian troops,” wrote Nelipovich, ” thanks to the Brusilov method.”;(to deliver multidirectional strikes across the entire front line) choked on their own blood … Kovel, which attracted all the attention of Brusilov, like Selena Lunatic, was never taken, despite the monstrous losses of three armies that stormed it in vain. It is no accident that many authors have linked the disintegration of the Russian army with the collapse of hopes for the development of success as a result of the Brusilov offensive.

Источник aif.ru

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